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REPLIES
A NEW AGENDA FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS: ECONOMIC FREEDOM
John 0. McGinnis*
I am pleased to have the opportunity to comment briefly on Edwin D.
Williamson's essay, U.S.-EU Understanding on Helms-Burton: A Missed
Opportunity to Fix International Law on Property Rights.' The essay is a
characteristically detailed and thoughtful work that outlines the failure of
the U.S.-EU Understanding to vindicate the property rights that the Cas-
tro regime has abrogated. The essay then suggests that the United States
and European Union (EU) should have used this opportunity to formu-
late an international convention for the protection of property rights.2
Rather than commenting further on the specifics of the proposal, I
would like to focus on its contribution to transforming international hu-
man rights law. It is a sad truth that property rights and other individual
economic freedoms have been the stepchild of international human
rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,3 and the two most
important conventions, the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights,' offer guarantees of all sorts of civil and political rights. They
even mint welfare rights against the government, including, in one case,
the right to have the government assure paid holidays!' Neither of the
Covenants, however, contains a right to compensation for takings of
Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School. I am grateful to Professors Minasse Haile
and Malvina Halberstam for their helpful comments, and to Edwin Williamson for sug-
gesting me as a commentator.
1. Edwin D. Williamson, U.S.-EU Understanding on Helms-Burton: A Missed Op-
portunity to Fix International Law on Property Rights, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 293 (1999).
2. See id. at 293, 304.
3. G.A. Res. 217A(III), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
4. G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
5. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
6. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note
4, art. 7(d).
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property or provides protection for other individual economic freedoms,
such as the right to contract. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights mentions property rights but provides only for "the right to own
property" and the right not to "be arbitrarily deprived of ... property."7
It provides no specification of what constitutes property. It is wholly si-
lent on other economic freedoms, like the right to contract.
The neglect of property rights and other individual economic freedoms
in international human rights law has deep roots in some of the most un-
fortunate chapters of this century's history. First, the international hu-
man rights conventions were negotiated during the period of the Cold
War. The Communist bloc opposed property rights because communism
did not approve of large-scale property holding. Instead, the bloc sup-
ported the inclusion of welfare rights because this was an area in which it
could argue (falsely, of course) that it had greater achievements than the
West. The West, on the other hand, wanted to obtain agreement on hu-
man rights conventions in order to build a platform for pressing the
Communist bloc on political rights. To some extent, the current interna-
tional human rights covenants represent a compromise; the West ob-
tained the inclusion of civil and political rights in these covenants in re-
turn for the exclusion of property rights and other individual economic
freedoms.
Second, at the time the major human rights covenants were negotiated,
economic freedoms were of relatively low priority, even in the West.
This century has witnessed the rise of the welfare state with the concomi-
tant decline of property rights. Indeed, the idea that property rights
against the state should be subordinated to equality distinguishes the
welfare state from the more laissez-faire regimes that they replaced. The
powerful state necessary to provide welfare rights is prevented, theoreti-
cally, from acting tyrannically by civil and political rights. Therefore, af-
ter the rise of social democracy, civil rights, like the right to vote out and
criticize leaders, became the paradigmatic constitutive liberties, displac-
ing the right to hold and use property.
In the United States, this evolution can be traced through constitu-
tional law. To gain the centralized authority necessary for large-scale so-
cial reform, the government had to be liberated from the features of the
original design that had been crafted to limit its power to interfere with
individual liberties, including economic freedoms. Thus, in the New
Deal, the structural checks of federalism and the separation of powers
7. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 3, art. 17.
1030 [Vol148:1029
A New Agenda for International Human Rights
were weakened substantially. 8 Moreover, until the last decade, substan-
tive protections for property and contract rights all but disappeared. 9
With the dissolution of these venerable checks on the power of the state,
advocates of the New Deal had to look elsewhere for restraint; they
found it in the reasoned deliberations of citizens in the democratic proc-
10ess.
Under this new paradigm, the citizens' abilities to engage in sustained
social criticism and vote out their rulers, rather than the autonomy pro-
vided by substantial property rights, would prevent a powerful state from
becoming a tyrannical state. Thus, the First Amendment" and related
civil rights naturally took center stage as the principal means of guaran-
teeing "open political dialogue and process."' 2 It is therefore not sur-
prising that the content of international human rights covenants reflect
the social democratic consensus that was sufficiently powerful to dissolve
much of our original Constitution.,
Finally, the process of declaring human rights through treaties may
also have contributed to the exaltation of welfare rights over economic
freedoms. Treaties and government programs providing welfare rights
empower politicians (and bureaucrats) that negotiate them because the
same politicians (and bureaucrats) determine the beneficiaries of such
programs, and the sources of revenues that fund them. 3 On the other
8. For a discussion of the collapse of federalism, see generally Richard A. Epstein,
The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1987), and for a discus-
sion of the collapse of separation of powers restraints, see generally Gary Lawson, The
Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994).
9. See generally G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Ju-
risprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999
(1972) (detailing the transformation of social thought that led to the declining willingness
of the courts to enforce economic liberties).
10. See David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1699, 1734
(1991) (defining increased First Amendment protections as facilitating majority control of
the newly empowered post New Deal state). First Amendment theory developed in the
post-New Deal era to promote democratic deliberation was not entirely novel, but had
roots in the progressive area and theories of Zechariah Chafee. See MARK A. GRABER,
TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH, THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM
122-64 (1991) (noting Chafee's belief that free speech is a procedural prerequisite for all
democratic societies).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 112 (1980) (explaining that the
"central function" of the First Amendment is to "assur[e] an open political dialogue and
process").
13. See generally Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model
of International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDOZO
L. REV. 925 (1996) (suggesting that politicians and bureaucrats try to expand their juris-
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hand, property rights are effective in restraining the power of politicians
and bureaucrats, and thus the lawmakers are less likely to include such
provisions in their treaties.
One measure of the weak status of property rights in this era is the
erosion of the right of aliens to compensation for expropriations. This
guarantee is not rooted in international human rights law, but in interna-
tional obligations of nations toward aliens of other countries. Neverthe-
less, this obligation has come under attack from both communist nations
and former colonies. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,4 Justice
Harlan observed: "[t]here are few if any issues in international law today
on which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state's
power to expropriate the property of aliens."' 5
Today, the social democratic consensus responsible for the erosion of
property rights and other economic freedoms has itself been challenged.
Our age has rediscovered the powerful argument that respect for prop-
erty is the best guarantor of wealth, social stability, and civil rights. 6
Ownership of land, labor, and intellectual creation all generate riches be-
cause they assure that individuals gain the fruits of their improvements,
toil, and creativity. Clearly delineated and rigorously enforced property
rights also reduce social conflict because everyone knows what is his.
Furthermore, property rights can ultimately protect the exercise of civil
and political rights because property alone provides the resources em-
powering individuals to resist the state.
This view also has support in Western history - the history that is the
source of human rights. This history has shown that property rights cre-
ate prosperity. 17 Prosperity, in turn, creates a rising middle class that de-
mands civil and political rights because these rights help the middle class
secure its property against the dangers of both tyrannical government
and political instability.
The case for protection of property rights has drawn strength from
empirical studies of countries throughout the world. In our contempo-
rary world, respect for property and freedom from government regula-
diction and power through treaties).
14. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
15. Id. at 428.
16. For a discussion of the revival of property rights in legal and political theory, see
generally, TOM BETHELL, THE NOBLEST TRIUMPH: PROPERTY AND PROSPERTIY
THROUGH THE AGES (1998).
17. For a book that shows the importance of prperty rights in generating prosperity,
see generally, DAVID S. LANDES, THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS (1998).
[Vol 48:10291032
A New Agenda for International Human Rights
18tion and taxes continues to generate economic prosperity. There is a
high correlation between respect for economic freedoms and respect for
civil rights.' 9 Finally, there is no fundamental tension between property
rights and social stability. Indeed, if property rights increase the average
income of members of a nation, that nation becomes more stable. °
Thus, it is a propitious time to consider how to translate the new intel-
lectual respectability of economic freedom into new guarantees for prop-
erty and contract rights internationally." Edwin Williamson's suggestion
is to proceed with a new international convention on property rights.22
Other avenues also are possible. First, the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT)23 could be used to encourage greater respect for
property rights. Ultimately, this route may be more plausible because
the prospect of gains through international trade may give the friends of
property rights greater leverage. I note, for instance, that the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)24 rec-
ognizes a right to copyright.25 Second, our foreign aid could be restricted
statutorily so that recipients would have to provide a variety of property
rights to their own citizens. This avenue may begin creating the consen-
18. See JAMES GWARTNEY ET AL., ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD xxiii
(1995) (contrasting the growth rates of the countries that have the persistently high levels
of economic freedom with countries that have persistently low levels).
19. See id. at 67. Listed countries with persistently high economic freedoms also en-
joy greater protection for civil rights than listed countries with persistently low levels of
economic freedom. See id.
20. See Richard A. Posner, Equality, Wealth, and Political Stability, 13 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 344, 344 (1997) (increasing "average incomes in a society ... increase[s] political
stability").
21. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97
MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998). Some conservatives who are sympathetic to property rights
might nevertheless object to making them part of international law because they believe
that human rights are not an appropriate subject for international law. First, however,
property rights are related to commerce and therefore within the ambit of Congress' enu-
merated powers under the Commerce Clause, at least as this clause is now interpreted.
Thus, a treaty on property rights would comport with the strict reading of the scope of
treaty-making put forward by Curtis Bradley. See id. at 394. Second, even if one objects
as a policy matter to international human rights covenants on grounds of interference with
national sovereignty, these covenants are not likely to disappear. Insofar as they have be-
come part of international law, it seems prudent to make the content of human rights
covenants as sensible as possible.
22. See Williamson, supra note 1, at 293, 304, 312-13.
23. Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
24. Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33
I.L.M. 81 (1994).
25. See id. art. 9; 33 I.L.M. at 87.
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sus in favor of property rights necessary to make such rights customary
under international law.
Whichever vehicles are chosen, economic freedoms, including property
and contract rights, should be placed at the top of a new agenda for in-
ternational human rights. It is time to share the benefits of the real
sources of Western historical progress with the rest of the world. Secu-
rity for property rights will not only generate prosperity, but will do
much in the long run to strengthen the political and civil rights univer-
sally applauded, but widely ignored, in international covenants.
